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DignityandtheCapabilitiesApproachinLong-TermElderlyCare
Abstract
 
The ageing populations of the Western world present a wide range of economic, social and cultural 
implications, and given the challenges posed by deteriorating maintenance ratios, the scenario is 
somewhat worrying. In this paper, I investigate whether Martha C. Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach could secure dignity for the elderly in long-term care, despite the per capita decreases in 
resources. My key research question asks ‘what implications does Nussbaum’s theory have for 
practical social care?’ My methodology combines Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities 
with ethnographic data gathered from a Finnish sheltered home for the elderly. On the basis of this 
study, it seems that the capabilities approach is a plausible framework for the ethics of elderly care 
because it highlights differences in the ability to function and thus differences in opportunities to 
pursue a good life. The ideas presented in this article could assist social policy planners and 
executives in creating policies and practices that help old people to maintain their dignity until the 
end of their days. 
Keywords: Capabilities approach, long-term elderly care, eudaimonia, dignity, Martha C. 
Nussbaum  
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To get back my youth I would do anything in the world, except take exercise, get up early, or be 
respectable.  -Oscar Wilde- 

Introduction
 
Although an ageing population and climate change may be totally different kinds of challenges to 
humankind, they have something in common. Statistics prove that the climate is warming and 
scientists tell us that this is irreversible. All we can do is try to slow its progress and cope with the 
consequences. Statistics also prove that Western societies are ageing fast, and social scientists tell 
us, due to younger generations are outnumbered by the old, the ageing of our own populations is at 
least temporarily irreversible. Both climate change and age structure change have similar 
mechanisms; the march of culture has resulted in environmental and age structure shifts that will 
have huge economic impacts. These effects will have huge a social impact globally and locally, and 
it is not fair to leave future generations to foot the bill. Like climate change, we need to accept that 
ageing is happening and deal with the consequences.  
Western societies are ageing rapidly, and Finland is ageing fastest (Giannakouris 2008, Christensen 
et al. 2009, Official Statistics Finland 2012, Eurostat 2013). Finnish baby boomers, i.e. the 
generation born 1945–1954, are now entering retirement and will increase the demand on health 
and social services in the near future (Statistics Finland 2007). There has been widespread public 
discussion and political debate on the topic, and a new law concerning elderly people’s rights to 
health care and social services came into effect on 1 July 2013. Changes in pension schemes, such 
as retirement age and the terms of voluntary pension insurance, are also being negotiated. Overall, 
the maintenance ratio continues to deteriorate, meaning fewer working people will have to support a 
growing number of non-working people. In these times of decreasing economic resources, the focus 
of social justice and the perception of the good life might change to a direction less dependent upon 
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the equity of resources but more upon the equity of opportunities (Allmark 2013, Molina-Mula & 
De Pedro-Gomez 2013).  
In this article, I study the elderly’s opportunities to feel dignified when receiving long-term elderly 
care. Promoting dignity can be regarded as the promotion of capabilities, where capabilities are seen 
as opportunities to pursue a good life. Of course, a ‘good life’ is a subjective and experiential 
phenomenon, so naming it as the aim of care requires clarification. Some kind of general or 
universal perception of the good life is needed, and a helping hand is extended from some 2300 
years ago. Aristotle’s definition of the factors of human well-being or eudaimonia creates a solid 
foundation for our purposes. Finnish philosopher Juha Sihvola (1998) has eloquently explicated 
Aristotle’s view on human well-being in The Nicomachean Ethics (1962): 
Eudaimonia requires preparedness for living a full human life without unfair risks, being 
healthy, satisfying the basic needs for nourishment, shelter and sexuality, using and developing 
one’s senses and capacities to imagine and think, studying an extensive cognitive world view, 
bonding with other people, participating in the planning of one’s own life and life of one’s 
community, and living in well-balanced relation to nature. (Sihvola 1998, 32, my translation) 
Upon this Aristotelian virtue-ethics, Martha C. Nussbaum (2007, 2011) has built her capabilities 
approach, which appears to be a very applicable theory for securing the basis of dignity in long-
term elderly care. Peter Allmark (2013) has recently demanded the application of the capabilities 
approach to special areas, so this article represents my response to his call.  
TheCapabilitiesApproachRe-examined
 
The capabilities approach was originally introduced by Amartya Sen (1973, 1976) in the 1970s as a 
critique of the prevalent Theory of justice by John Rawls (1973). The substance of justice in Sen's 
theory is radically different from that of Rawls’. The former considers equity of opportunities to be 
the aim of justice, whereas the latter regards the equity of opportunities as a reason to approve 
differences concerning the distribution of resources. For Rawls, unfair distribution is acceptable as 
long as everyone has similar opportunities to pursue a better life. Sen’s essential idea is that 
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resources are useless unless one can convert them into opportunities that support the achievement of 
the desired functionings, i.e. one’s aims in life. To Sen (1995, 2001) functionings include a wide 
range of human action that incorporates both being and doing; being properly nourished and eating 
are both functionings. Nussbaum (2007, 2011) has developed the capabilities approach since the 
1980s. Both Sen and Nussbaum emphasize the equity of opportunities, the plurality of human 
desires and the difference in people’s abilities to pursue them. Nussbaum, however, has a more 
distinct, Aristotelian perspective of ethics. Regardless of the fundamental plurality of human nature, 
she considers it possible to elucidate essential human capabilities i.e. the aspects of life that make it 
worth living in general. To Nussbaum (2007, 2011), capabilities are opportunities to be and to do 
things according to one’s own aims in life. Capabilities need to be converted to functionings to 
reach Nussbaum’s eudaimonia. 
Nussbaum has outlined a list of human capabilities that she regards as essential and universal. Her 
aim is to apply these universal capabilities to particular contexts. I believe that the concept of 
capability requires some clarification and refinement for the context of elderly care. A capability 
can easily be mixed up with an ability to function. I would argue that a person’s own ability to 
function is a central but not essential part of a capability. A capability consists of the need or will to 
function (i.e. a desire), whereas the ability to function incorporates the actualization of one’s ability 
with the means of doing so.  
In order to demonstrate this approach, let us apply one of Nussbaum’s capabilities to a sheltered 
home for the elderly. Affiliation is a capability concerning social interaction and sense of being a 
member of a community. According to Nussbaum (2007, 2011) we need to be able to live with and 
for others. What does this mean when we consider, for example, the physically disabled but 
mentally able elderly person living in a sheltered home? How can her opportunities for affiliation be 
secured? What type of care would support her dignity according to the capabilities approach? 
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Firstly, there is the issue of desire. An elderly person may have a desire to be with other people. We 
must constantly bear in mind that capabilities are, before anything else, opportunities, not 
necessities. A just society provides people with genuine opportunities. For example, freedom of 
religion is not just freedom to choose what one believes in, but also freedom to choose whether to 
believe or not. Similarly, in a sheltered home, freedom of affiliation is not just the freedom to 
choose one’s company but also the freedom to choose whether to be alone or among other people. 
Currently, I am afraid this is not a real choice for all residents of sheltered homes. On the basis of 
my study experience, loneliness is a problem for the elderly in institutions as well as for those living 
alone at home. Nevertheless, being alone is not automatically loneliness, so being in company must 
be an opportunity, not a necessity, in sheltered homes. 
Secondly, there is the issue of ability. An elderly person must be able to join other people if she 
wants to. This means that if she is physically unable to move herself, the care system should make it 
possible. Are there enough moving aids, e.g. wheelchairs for residents and enough staff to help 
those unable to manage independently with those aids? During the last year there has been a heated 
public and political discussion about the staffing ratio in long-term elderly care in Finland. Parties 
on the political left wanted to legislate a minimum staffing ratio of 0.5 staff members per resident, 
but parties on the political right won, so there is only a recommendation on this matter in the new 
law concerning the elderly’s rights to health care and social services. The Right had quite a 
reasonable argument on this matter; it is not just to tie staffing ratio to numbers, rather staffing 
should be based on local needs. Nevertheless, the argument of the Left was even more 
Nussbaumian; 0.5 is the threshold of good care. Providing 0.5 is just, providing more is proper.  
Thirdly, there is the issue of means. The desire to join others and the ability to reach them is useless 
if there is no proper space to socialize. Sheltered homes should provide their residents with 
comfortable and spacious common rooms. The public sector is responsible for providing long-term 
elderly care in Finland, but during the last few years, it has outsourced service provision to private 
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enterprises. Private enterprises are undeniably more effective than the public sector in many ways in 
their elderly care provision, but this effectiveness can lead to – and has led to – the compromise of 
the ethics of care. Commercial management might view spacious common rooms in sheltered 
homes as financially unproductive spaces and sacrifice them. I have worked in a brand-new 
building which had no common space for residents’ activities. The public sector should be more 
demanding as a buyer of services. 
Fourthly, there is the issue of access. Common spaces are useless if they are not accessible to 
residents at will. The life of a resident in a sheltered home should be arranged on basis of her 
desires, not according to needs of the nursing organization. Elderly people in sheltered homes 
should be independent with their time management in daily living, just like those living at home. I 
have worked in two places where there were common rooms for residents but they were closed after 
dinner. Residents spent long evenings in their apartments alone, with a quick visit by a practical 
nurse being the only human contact. Such treatment feels like a disregard of the human desires of 
the residents.  
This clarification demonstrates the capacity of the capabilities approach to be a multidimensional 
concept. Capability entails the dimensions of desire, ability, means and access. In the case of 
affiliation, dignity in elderly care begins by taking the resident’s desires into account. Just elderly 
care then provides mobility aids, helping hands, and a comfortable and spacious room that is 
accessible when the residents want it. Naturally, affiliation for a resident can involve more than 
socializing with other residents inside the sheltered home. It may include meeting friends and 
relatives, taking part in civic society and interacting with society at large. When the concept of 
capability is understood in this way, the capabilities approach seems applicable to long-term elderly 
care. In the next section, I will elaborate Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities further.  
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Nussbaum’sListandtheLong-termCareoftheElderly
 
Nussbaum (2007, 2011) has stressed that her list of capabilities is only one of those possible. She 
urges us to apply her list to various regional, cultural and functional areas. Therefore, I apply her list 
to long-term elderly care in Finland to study whether it maintains its plausibility. This section is 
based on empirical ethnographical data I collected for my master’s thesis that was accepted by the 
University of Jyväskylä (Pirhonen 2012). I observed life in a sheltered home for 43 days (334.5 
hours) in summer 2011 and made field notes. Additionally, my ethnographical data involved taking 
part in the daily life of my research subjects and unrecorded conversations with residents, their 
relatives and staff. Before taking my master’s degree in philosophy and sociology, I worked for a 
number of years as a practical nurse in sheltered homes. I apply each of Nussbaum’s capabilities to 
elderly care in turn. For every capability, I present Nussbaum’s definition followed by my 
specifications. 
Life
 
Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living (Nussbaum 
2011, 33).  
As the residents of long-term elderly care have already lived a life of normal length, I concentrate 
on the final part of Nussbaum’s definition. The criteria of a life worth living are complex and 
individual, so everyone should make their own definition. This could be done when an elderly 
person needs care services for the first time, or at the latest by the time she enters long-term elderly 
care. Every elderly person should be given information about the opportunity of writing a living 
will while being cognitively capable of doing so. Of course, writing a living will should be 
voluntary. In a living will, an individual could personally define their own life worth living. Such a 
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will might contain a prohibition to resuscitate if a person’s own terms of a life worth living are no 
longer met. The right to euthanasia is commonly brought up in discussions about quality of life. 
Finnish legislation prohibits it and the Finnish Medical Association opposes it, but public opinion is 
becoming more favourable, so the discussion will continue. One element of a dignified death could 
be the opportunity to die at home. In the past, elderly people in Finland were transferred to hospitals 
and health centres to die, although many elderly people prefer familiar surroundings. Fortunately 
this situation is changing little by little, although sheltered homes should be equipped to deal with 
the death of residents. Of course, a life worth living is much more than the opportunity to have a 
dignified death. To actualize this capability, decent elderly care must secure all the following 
capabilities to the best of its ability. 
BodilyHealth
 
Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter (Nussbaum 2011, 33). 
Reproductive health is not a topical issue with residents in sheltered homes, but good health, 
adequate nourishment and shelter are. The older people are, the more they use pharmaceuticals 
(Barat et al. 2000, Mintzer & Burns 2000). Successful medication is therefore an important factor of 
good health in sheltered homes. Pharmacotherapy should be planned by a geriatrician or a doctor 
with geriatric expertise because elderly people metabolise drugs differently compared with younger 
people. Pharmacotherapy should also be regularly evaluated to avoid unnecessary drug-taking. The 
logistics of drug delivery should be carefully planned and executed, and to ensure justice, 
pharmacotherapy should not depend on the resident’s wealth. Finland has a well-functioning 
compensation system for drug expenses. After the first 670 euros per calendar year, the customer 
pays 1.50 euros per prescription and the state pays the rest. For those who live on social relief, 
income support covers all medical expenses. 
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Besides pharmacotherapy, there are a number of factors that affect the health of residents. There 
should be a gym and physiotherapists to assist residents in every sheltered home. Unfortunately this 
cannot be taken for granted because gyms, like common rooms, can be seen as non-profit spaces in 
sheltered homes. Diverse nutrition is another matter that affects health (Rudman 1989, Chandra 
1990). Old people are quite particular about their food (Schlettwein-Gsell 1992), and I have 
witnessed countless times how pizzas and paellas end up uneaten. It may be acceptable to 
compromise the diversity of nutrition to secure the willingness of elderly people to eat. Taste is 
more significant than nutrition when considering food in sheltered homes. After all, it is only the 
food you eat that will nourish you.  
Obviously, sheltered homes should provide elderly people with proper shelter (Marquardt & 
Schmieg 2009). This means providing healthy and safe surroundings which take into account the 
special needs of elderly people. Ensuring adequate shelter includes the architecture, the choice of 
surface materials, and the planning of staffing and materials logistics. There are usually residents 
whose functional cognitive ability has declined, so some kind of access control system and security 
system are appropriate. On the whole, health is probably the most important single capability 
concerning human well-being (Daniels 2010, Wolff & De-Shalit 2010).   
BodilyIntegrity
 
Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against 
violent assault; including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for 
sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction (Nussbaum 2011, 33). 
The ability to move freely may be compromised when one’s physical and/or cognitive ability 
declines as a consequence of ageing. This capability may be secured by offering subsidised 
transportation and escorts that help to run errands. In Finland, it is possible to use taxis at public 
transport prices when one’s functional decline is acknowledged by a doctor. Staff management at 
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sheltered homes should allow residents to be escorted outside. While sheltered home residents are 
usually adequately secured against violent assaults, more worrying is the phenomenon of ‘nursing 
by force’. There has been an animated public debate on this matter in Finland. Old people have 
been tied down or heavily dosed with sedatives to prevent dangerous situations, and it has been 
claimed that nursing staff do this just to ease their work. The use of force should always be the last 
resort and the correct procedure is legislatively outlined in Finland. The third aspect of bodily 
integrity, sexuality, should also be considered in elderly care. We are sexual beings until the end of 
our days (Walz 2002). Romances between residents should be looked on favourably if there are no 
signs of abuse whatsoever. It should be self-evident that residents can express their sexuality and 
gender identity with their clothing, hairstyle, cosmetics etc. just like the rest of us. I have observed 
that women usually behave like ladies in sheltered homes, and boys will be boys, regardless of their 
age. 
Senses,ImaginationandThought
 
Senses, imagination, and thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and 
reason […] in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to 
both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have 
pleasant experiences and avoid nonbeneficial pain (Nussbaum 2011, 33). 
In sheltered homes, there should be opportunities to do everything that one does when living at 
home. Residents pay considerable sums to live in sheltered homes, so they should have access to 
good quality activities that stimulate the senses, the imagination and thought. Day care centres run 
by professional instructors and occupational therapists are most desirable (Howie 2005). Residents 
should also be encouraged to take part in the day-to-day activities of the place they live in, for 
example, by cooking and cleaning in accordance to their ability and wishes. Trips outside should be 
easily arranged, and cultural, religious and political activities could be brought into sheltered homes 
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and made available to residents. Nussbaum’s point of avoiding non-beneficial pain is salient when 
considering the elderly. Ageing can lead to physical pain caused, for example, by arthritis and 
attrition of the joints. Doctors should always consider which is worse, addiction to pain killers or 
constant pain at the end of one’s life. 
Emotions
 
Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to 
love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general to love, to 
grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and just anger. Not having one’s emotional 
development blighted by fear and anxiety (Nussbaum 2011, 33–34).  
During the course of our lives, we form close attachments with various people, possessions, places, 
ideologies etc. Moving from one’s own home to a sheltered home should not intrinsically cut off 
any of these attachments, except for the obvious fact that one can no longer live in one’s own home. 
‘Home-likeness’ is the one slogan of long-term care in Finland today. Conceptually, however, it is 
highly problematic. Would you like to drive to work in a car-like object and eat some food-like 
substance for lunch? Would you like to have a home-like apartment where you live with your 
spouse-like partner, to live happily-like ever after? Sheltered homes should be seen as homes – at 
least there should be an actual opportunity to do so. After all, residents will probably spend the rest 
of their lives there.  
As we have already seen, affection for other people can be maintained with common rooms in 
sheltered homes. In addition, there should be private spaces to socialize with friends and relatives, 
and access to all modern communications equipment. Emotional attachments to possessions can be 
maintained by furnishing sheltered home apartments with the residents’ own furniture and 
ornaments. On the basis of my experience, I believe that one’s emotional life can be balanced only 
if one feels at home in a sheltered home. One of the saddest things I encountered were those elderly 
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people who would not accept the sheltered home as their home and were constantly packing their 
bags to leave. The reason for this behaviour is usually some kind of cognitive weakening, but the 
emotions are real. Care producers should understand that a home is more than walls and furniture. It 
is an emotional space. An old adage states ‘home is where the heart is’, meaning that your home 
follows you because it is located within yourself. Home is the place where you can be yourself. A 
sheltered home can be a true home only if the daily routines are based around the residents, not on 
the schedules and needs of the care-giving organization. 
Practicalreason
 
Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s life (Nussbaum 2011, 34). 
As rational animals, practical reasoning is an important capability for us. The significance of 
rationality as a characteristic of human beings is obvious in ethics. Nussbaum’s (2007, 2009a, 
2009b, 2011) and Macintyre’s (2012) Aristotelian concept of rationality as one factor among others 
creating eudaimonia is a plausible basis for dignity in elderly care. Nussbaum (2009b) points out 
that stressing rationality is problematic when considering the increasing number of cognitively 
disabled people in ageing Western societies. 
The ability to form a conception of the good and to plan one’s life according to it means having 
proper, understandable information about one’s own situation and one’s choices in long-term 
elderly care. Therefore, the service system should be clear to any elderly person and her close 
relatives. Information about care for the elderly should be in plain language and every elderly 
person should be guided through it personally, and in good time to avoid problems caused by 
cognitive decline. A person’s own views on suitable care could be written down in a living will, for 
example. Close relatives can also provide valuable information about an individual’s conception of 
the good life and quality care. 
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Affiliation
 
Nussbaum’s next capability is affiliation, which I already introduced in the previous chapter. I 
mentioned that affiliation is defined as being able to live with and for others in suitable 
surroundings in sheltered homes. There is, however, a further aspect to affiliation: 
Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others (Nussbaum 2011, 34). 
I believe self-respect is important enough to be an autonomous capability when considering long-
term elderly care. It is very strongly linked to affiliation yet it has its own implications for quality of 
life and dignity, and has both individual and collective dimensions in elderly care. Individually, 
every elderly person should be treated as an end within elderly care. The elderly are an extremely 
heterogeneous group; every life is unique. From a Nussbaumian point of view, just elderly care is 
not about caring for everyone similarly but caring for everyone on the basis of her needs. Equality is 
not the equal distribution of resources but an equal effort to compensate for the losses in 
opportunities to pursue a good life, of which self-respect is a self-evident part. Reciprocity is also 
worthy of note when considering individual self-respect (Wolff & De-Shalit 2010). One who 
receives wants to give because reciprocity creates equality. There should therefore be ways for 
residents to give back in sheltered homes, for example, by taking part in housework or being treated 
as an authority on life.  
On a collective level, self-respect includes organizational and societal aspects. Organizational self-
respect is about us, the residents of a particular sheltered home, and about residents’ rights in 
relation to the service system. An obvious way to support this kind of self-respect is to develop 
organizational democracy in order to improve residents’ opportunities to influence their 
surroundings. Societal self-respect deals with representations of old age and old people 
(Featherstone & Hepworth 2005). In Finland, the public discussion of old age in general is often 
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associated with societal problems; elderly people primarily represent an expense. Their pensions are 
a burden on the younger generations and their care will be too great an expense in the future. If this 
is not ageism then what is? It would be wise to remember that we will be the elderly in the future.  
OtherSpecies
 
Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and 
the world of nature (Nussbaum 2011, 34). 
There are two ways to bring sheltered home residents closer to nature: take them to nature, or bring 
nature to them. There should be cosy gardens or yards around sheltered homes, and residents should 
have easy access to them. In urban areas where this is not possible, regular trips to gardens or other 
suitable destinations should be arranged. There should at least be a wide range of plants indoors. 
One striking feature of sheltered homes is the absence of animals. Normally, it would be impossible 
to find a building of a few dozen inhabitants where there are no pets at all. It seems that pets are 
categorically forbidden in long-term elderly care. In places where residents have their own rooms or 
apartments, at least, they should be allowed to have pets that they can take care of themselves. 
Forbidding pets is more a problem of attitudes than practicality. I have been to a sheltered home 
where residents had a collective cat. It wandered wherever it wanted and staff took care of its food 
and litter. Both staff and residents were happy with this arrangement. It is not ‘home-like’ to sit in a 
rocking chair with a cat on your lap – it is home. Furthermore, having animals around can be very 
therapeutic in many ways (Banks & Banks 2002). 
Play
 
Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities (Nussbaum 2011, 34). 
Happiness may be an endogenous phenomenon, but it is founded on one’s surroundings. The 
general atmosphere of a sheltered home affects the residents’ happiness. A sheltered home manager 
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once told me that it is good to hear residents complaining about their circumstances. This strange 
comment was explained when she added that complaining indicates that the residents feel safe. In 
an atmosphere of fear, the residents would be silent. Atmosphere is based on management in 
sheltered homes, so if managers treat staff badly or unjustly, it inevitably has negative effects on 
resident satisfaction. A poor working atmosphere leads to a poor living atmosphere. Therefore, 
management training is extremely important (Burgio & Burgio 1990). 
One simple and well-tested way to bring joy to residents is to break routines. Drinking coffee 
outside on a summer’s day, barbecuing sausages or taking a trip to a market brings smiles to the 
residents’ faces. A party tied to a theme or a season is always popular among residents. Celebrating 
life is something we all should remember to do on a regular basis. 
ControloverOne’sEnvironment
 
Control over one’s environment. (A) Political. Being able to participate effectively in 
political choices that govern one’s life. (B) Material. Being able to hold property, and 
have property rights on an equal basis with others… (Nussbaum 2011, 34). 
Basic political participation is secured in Finland through institutional voting. There is the 
opportunity to vote inside geriatric facilities and to use an assistant during every public election. 
Due to societal ageing, elderly care has been a big issue in the latest elections. One day it would be 
nice to see candidates include visits to sheltered homes on their regular campaign trails. Local 
branches of political parties could seize the initiative by taking concrete action to improve the 
quality of life in local sheltered homes. As mentioned in the section on ‘affiliation’, the importance 
of institutional democracy and residential participation should not be overlooked. 
Elderly peoples’ material environments are based on their wealth and savings accumulated during 
their lifetime as well as on pensions and other social security. For sheltered home residents, the key 
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issues are regular incomes and the cost of treatment, with the former determining the latter in 
public-based elderly care. The purchasing power of pensions must be secured by regular index 
increments and the costs of treatment should be considered in social policy. 
Nussbaum (2007, 2011) states that her list is a proposal, albeit a very justifiable one. Capabilities 
could be weighted according to different cultural or local surroundings. Some capabilities could be 
seen as central capabilities that organize and pervade the others; Nussbaum herself considers 
affiliation and practical reason as examples of such capabilities. When considering the list, one must 
keep in mind that central capabilities are not merely instrumental but constituent parts of a 
worthwhile human life (Nussbaum 2011, 36).  
Exercising this criterion, I would add a new capability to the list, at least when considering Finnish 
sheltered home residents – a sense of security and trust. I believe that a worthwhile human life is 
partly based on the confidence that you’ll receive help when you need it – regardless of the political 
and economic framework of the society. This is why MacIntyre (2012) calls us rational dependent 
animals. For a sheltered home resident, a sense of security and trust is based at least on skilled 
nursing staff, the atmosphere of the home, the continuity of care and public representations of old 
age and the elderly. In essence, a sense of security and trust can only thrive when Nussbaum’s list 
has been adequately implemented. 
Discussion
 
On the basis of this study, the capabilities approach is an applicable theory of justice concerning 
long-term elderly care, at least if the purpose of care is defined as supporting an elderly person’s 
dignity. The very purpose of the capabilities approach is to secure the pursuit of the good life for 
everyone. The good life manifests itself as the dignity that arises from human well-being. In turn, 
well-being connects with every major dimension of human life. For example, it connects with good 
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health, welfare, the material standard of living, social relations, the meaningfulness of life and a 
comfortable living environment (Vaarama 2009).  
As we have seen, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is aimed at securing overall well-being, i.e. 
flourishing or eudaimonia. This is especially the case in long-term elderly care, where clients’ 
opportunities to pursue a good life are diminished due to a decline in functional ability. Nussbaum’s 
idea of capabilities is highly relevant for just elderly care; its purpose is to help elderly people to 
live according to their own aims in life, while compensating for the losses in physical, cognitive, 
social functional ability caused by ageing. Human diversity blossoms in old age.  
Diversity calls for the capabilities approach, but is this diversity too diffuse to generate general 
principles for good elderly care? Nussbaum herself (2011, 35) sees capabilities belonging first and 
foremost to individuals and only derivatively to groups. In the real world, however, care systems 
cannot function well without generalization, alignments, categorization and routines. Furthermore, 
standards are commercially effective. The capabilities approach acts as a buffer between individual 
persons and care systems because it focuses on offering people opportunities, not obligations. Just 
long-term elderly care provides people with opportunities to socialize, to take trips, to participate in 
house work, to have pets, to wake up when they want and everything else mentioned in this paper. 
Each person is allowed to choose whether to actualize an opportunity or not. The universality of 
Nussbaum’s capabilities is actually based on locality, because every capability must invariably be 
applied locally. 
The biggest challenge for the capabilities approach has always been the question of sufficiency. 
Nussbaum (2007, 2011) discusses thresholds of capabilities that must be reached to secure human 
dignity. But how does one define when life is dignified enough? This question includes aspects of 
subjective experience and objective measurement. Measuring capabilities is certainly not easy 
(Brighouse & Robeyns 2011). As Nussbaum (2007, 2009b) points out, the issue of sufficiency is 
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sometimes about equality and sometimes about adequacy. For example, political rights are a matter 
of equality, material rights are a matter of adequacy.  Perhaps defining thresholds is not the task of 
philosophers, but of social scientists. The development of quality of life indicators is engaging, and 
indicators of sufficiency might be developed together with those suggested by Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2010). 
The current discussion of elderly care is extremely resource-oriented, and for good reason. Nobody 
can deny the significance of the distribution of resources as a foundation of societal justice. 
Distribution must be fair and exceptions concerning equality must be well justified, as Rawls (1973, 
2001) stressed. However, justice is more than just fairness of distribution. Justice is also an 
emotional and experiential phenomenon. To illustrate this idea, consider this example from 
everyday life in sheltered homes. From a resource point of view, it is just and fair that every 
resident is allowed three diapers per day. However, would it be just to deny a resident a fourth 
diaper if she needed it? It depends on the staff whether the resident’s capabilities of health, bodily 
integrity, self-respect and sense of security and trust are actualized. The capabilities approach can 
bring additional value on top of resources by treating every resident as an end. 
It is important to understand the contingent nature of our perception of dignity, well-being and the 
good life. Perceptions change regionally, culturally and historically. Aristotle (1962) himself 
understood this since he talked about the discursive nature of ethics. He maintained that ethical 
principles were to be shaped by considering individual cases. If a principle and an individual case 
conflicts, the principle should be corrected. This very idea gives the capabilities approach its 
feasibility in long-term elderly care. The central ethical units in this case are the individual residents 
and individual sheltered homes. If Nussbaum’s list conflicts with an individual case, the list should 
be corrected to fit the local surroundings. This does not mean rejecting Nussbaum’s capabilities but 
applying her particular list to different cases. The formulation of a list of capabilities for elderly 
care requires a wide range of professionals: gerontologists, geriatricians, nursing scientists, nursing 
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professionals, officials, planners of social policy, and, of course, elderly people themselves. Since 
ethics is formulated through a dialectic between our values and the concrete world, there is also a 
role for philosophers. However, philosophers must clearly bear in mind the practical aim of this 
pursuit, i.e. securing or even improving the quality of life of elderly people. By doing so, 
philosophers may refute the criticism Marx and Engels aimed at contemporary German 
philosophers when they accused them “of representing not true requirements, but the requirements 
of truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of human nature, of man in general, who 
belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy” 
(Marx & Engels 1978, 75). 
 Elderly people do not exist in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy. We are the elderly of the 
future. 
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